The Rationale for Federal Funding of Pilot Electronic Markets in U.S. Agriculture by Henderson, Dennis R.
ES0-554 
THE RATIONALE FOR FEDERAL FUNDING OF 
PllOT ELECTRONIC MARKETS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE):/ 
Dennis R. Hendersonl/ 
There currently is considerable interest in the potential to 
r~vitalize the concept of organized, open markets for agricultural 
products through th~ application of modern communications and elec-
tronic data handling and computer systems, or the so-called electronic 
commodity markets. I have been involved in this quest for greater 
understanding of the potentia] benefits, and disadvantages, of the use 
of electronic marketing systems for agricultural products for practically 
all of my relatively young professional career. 
While on assignment to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service 
last year, I was able to catalyze interest in that agency to the point 
of providing finan~ial assistance for the further development of a few 
carefully chosen computerized marketing systt!ms on an experimental basis. 
That experimental initiative is now underway, and it should add signifi-
cantly to our collective knowledge of the feasibility of using computer-
ized, open marketing systems in agriculture and of their potentials and 
pitfalls. 
This Federal initiative means that interest in the potentials for 
electronic marketing in agriculture is now a matter of public policy. 
To help understand this growing interest, it is useful to briefly revisit 
some of the changes that have occurred in the organization and structure 
llcomments prepared for the Southeastern Poultry and Egg Convention, 
Atlanta, Georgia, January 25-27, 1979. 
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One of thP most notable changes in recent ycdrs hd<, been the 
decl~ne i.n the reJ at1ve importance of open, organized markets for 
agricultural products. This has been associated with a concomitant 
increase in the use of contracts, vertic~] integration, and other 
private treat1es directly n~gotiated between buyers and sellers. The 
explanat1on for this trend rests with the increasing speLialization o[ 
agricullural entcrpnses, with which we are all familiar. But, special-
ization is just one side of the coin; tne other side is interdependence. 
That is, as people and production activities become more specialized, 
they become more interdependent. An oft-used example is illustrative. 
No longer does the farmer raise his own source of power (horses), fuel 
(oat5) or f~ed. Now he is dependent upon a tractor supplier, a petroleum 
distributor and a feed formulator. Each of these, in turn, is dependent 
upon others, sud1 a"> steel mills, refiners, and soybean crushers. Examples 
can be extended ad nau&eum. 
The point. Greater specialization results in more interdependencies, 
which 1n turn increases the risk associated with market failures such as 
foreclosure or ldck of adequate supply. To minimize these risks, many 
businessmen, farmers and others in agriculture not withstanding, make 
some form of direct arrangement with their suppliers and/or those whom 
they supply. This reduces their dependency upon the vagrancies of the 
marketplace. 
In the past 15 to 20 years, the use of organized markets has declined 
appreciably for virtually every category of agricultural products. 
Vertical and contractual integration has now displaced about 25 percent 
of all potential market transactions for farm-produced products, although 
this varies widely among different products--from about 10 percent for 
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hogs and food grains to over 90 percent for broilers, milk and sugar 
crops. Furthermore, of that l"hich j s marh't(•d in some manner. a 
steadily increasing share is traded by private treaty rather than 
through an organized market: organized marketings of slaughter cattle 
accounted for just 20 percent of total production in 1974, compared 
to 60 percent in 1960. Private treaties now account for over 30 
percent of all feeder cattle transactions and more than 70 percent of 
all slaughter hog production. And by 1970, organized markets for 
eggs in the U.S. virtually disappeared, with all of the nonintegrated 
egg production then subjected to private agreement. 
In addition to gaining some protection against the risks associated 
with market uncertainty, other benefits of private agreement and other 
contracts include greater efficiency in product movement and improved 
communications between seller and buyer regarding quality and quantity 
requirements. However, there is increasing concern over the problems 
associated with the corollary decline in use of organized markets. 
These problems st<:m primarily from impacts upon competition in 
the market place. In comparison with viable organized markets, 
competition is often constrained in private treaty situations. There 
are several reasons. Among the most important are inaccurate price 
establishment procedures, variability in non-price terms of exchange, 
and manipulative trading practices. Let's briefly visit each. 
Price information becomes difficult to obtain and less useful 
for price establishment purposes as open market-trading declines. 
When organized public markets operate with relatively high volumes, 
the resulting prices are generally accurate reflections of marketwide 
supply and demand conditions. That is, such prices tend to be reasonably 
accurate measures of market value. These prices are also readily 
observable. Peripheral direct trades made on the basis of those prices 
have little markl•twide consequence. 
But, as contracting, integration, and direct trading expand, 
organized markets tend to become residual markets which cater primarily 
to marginal quantitites which do not move by private agreement or 
contract due to factors such as burdensome supplies or low product 
quality. As volume declines, the number of traders active on organized 
markets also declines, often to the point where at least tacit collusion 
is observable. The resulting prices are dubious indicators of market 
value. 
Also, the collection of useful price information from private 
agreements is exceedingly difficult, due to the large number of points 
where such transacti.ons occur, selective or even dishonest reporting, 
and variability in non-price terms of trade. Whereas in organized 
markets the reported prices are based upon all trades, reported prices 
from private transactions are by necessity a selective sample and 
are not necessarily representative of the majority of sales. Further, 
non-price terms such as transportation and handling, credit provision, 
liability for damagt', risk-sharing, and so on vary considerably in 
private treaties, making prices in various transactions not directly 
comparable. 
The potential for market manipulation also expands. Selective 
or inaccurate reporting (or no reporting) occurs more than occasionally. 
If, for example, a large buyer knows that subsequent purchases will 
be based upon the prices he reports on current transactions, the 
incentive to report on only relatively low-priced transactions is 
apparent. While hard evidence of such manipulation is difficult to 
obtain, information subpoenaed by the Committee on Small Business of 
the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977 and 1978 revealed that fewer 
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than 20 percent of the prices reported on the "Yellow She~:'t;' which is 
the pricing bible of the livestock-meat industry, could be substanti-
ated with actual records of the transactions reported. 
Concern over these competition and pricing problems has prompted 
much of the current interest in electronic trading. By electronic 
marketing, I am referring primarily to systems which utilize modern 
electronic communications and data handling facilities, such as 
teletype networks and digital computers, to facilitate simultaneous 
price negotiations among numerous buyers and sellers. 
Conceptually, electronic markets offer a means of maintaining the 
benefits of efficiency and improved buyer-seller coordination associated 
with direct agreements, while reducing the barriers to competitive 
pricing and open trading. The USDA initiative will help further test 
this concept. To date, four projects, have been funded: two to develop 
totally new systems--one for slaughter hogs and the other for feeder 
cattle, and two to 0ncourage expanded trading on existing systems--the 
Virginia-based slaughter cattle teleauction and the egg industry's 
computerized public trading floor operated by the Egg Clearinghouse, 
Incorporated (ECI). 
The egg industry, with its ECI system, has been a pioneer in the 
use of modern technology for organized, public trading. This industry 
is being closely watched by all segments of agriculture. Is computer-
ized electronic trading viable? Federal funding will help further 
extend its potential use in egg marketing. But the bottom line is, 
will the industry give it a fair trial? 

